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JUDICIAL REFORM: SETTING THE 
PRAIRIES AFIRE 
Monroe G. McKay* 
A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL REFORM. Edited by Patrick B. McGui-
gan and Randall R. Rader. Washington, D.C.: Free Congress Re-
search and Education Foundation, Inc. 1981. Pp. ix, 382. $10.95. 
In November 1981, the Free Congress Research and Education Founda-
tion 1 announced the publication of a collection of essays entitled A 
Blueprint for Judicial Reform. 2 Paul Weyrich, the president of the founda-
tion, stated that the publication of this book marked the beginning of a 
public campaign by his organization to seek limitations on the power of the 
federaljudiciary.3 Mr. Weyrich, described by the media as a "New Right" 
activist,4 stated, "Even if we do not succeed in changing the law or the 
Constitution, we will change the nature of the judiciary by making this a 
hot political issue."5 He added, "My business is to light the fire. If you 
have a real prairie fire, some reform will be adopted, either self-imposed or 
imposed from the outside."6 
Mr. Weyrich's remarks suggest that A Blueprint for Judicial Reform is 
not a product of detached, objective scholarship. Indeed, measured by the 
most generous scholarly standards, Blueprint is a work of dubious merit.7 
Nevertheless, the legal community should not instantly dismiss this book. 
Blueprint is the product of a vocal political faction; circumspection urges an 
appraisal of Blueprint in the context of its goals. 
As Mr. W eyrich's incendiary allusions indicate, Blueprint is first and 
foremost a work of partisan advocacy that seeks fundamental changes in 
the federal judiciary. Its editors recognize a general discontent with the 
American judicial system, a discontent that is shared within and without the 
courts.8 In publishing Blueprint, they attempt to promote radical, politi-
• Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The author would 
like to thank Jeffrey P. Minear and Majken Bood for assisting in the preparation of this book 
review. - Ed. 
l. The Free Congress Research and Education Foundation is a tax-exempt research organ-
ization. According to its own description, it "analyzes U.S. House and Senate elections," 
"studies current political trends," "analyzes important local and state ballot measures," and 
"focuses on trends affecting the stability and well-being of American family life." P. 382. 
2. Broder,New Right Sounds Attack on Courts, Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1981, at A3, col. 
2 (final edition). 
3. Sniffen, Conservatives Seek Curbs on Federal Judges, Associated Press, Nov. 9, 1981. 
4. Id 
5. Id 
6. Id 
1. See text at notes 22-37 infra. 
8. Certainly, this discontent is not a new phenomenon; lawyers have frequently pointed to 
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cally motivated reforms. Since the editors' goal is reform, Blueprint de-
serves evaluation as a vehicle for change. So viewed, Blueprint seems a 
certain failure. But in this regard it is an instructive failure that provides 
some revealing insights regarding the use of books to achieve institutional 
change.9 
A Blueprint for Judicial Reform is a compilation of twenty-two essays 
that ostensibly critiques the role played by the federal courts in American 
government. However, the title is misleading. The book does not provide a 
carefully drafted, schematic approach for altering the structure of the fed-
eral judiciary. Instead, the book gamers under one cover a series of short, 
unconnected essays on a wide range of special topics, many of which are 
only tangentially related to the structure, power, and authority of federal 
courts. 10 The essays are composed in a cursory fashion, each averaging 
about fifteen pages in length. With only a few exceptions, 11 they are bereft 
of the careful documentation and footnote support that underpins academic 
articles. Typographical errors and editorial lapses abound. 12 In sum, rather 
than resembling a blueprint, the book seems more akin to a collection of 
disparate sketches doodled upon a desktop blotter. 
The contributing authors include congressmen, congressional staff 
members, professors, state officials, and members of various political orga-
nizations. 13 These contributors all share the view that the federal courts 
have overstepped constitutional limits in cases involving such controversial 
issues as busing, school prayer, and abortion.14 To the extent that these 
divisive issues today define the terms "liberal" and "conservative," the con-
tributors are uniformly and extremely conservative. 
Blueprint is organized into six sections. The first contains two introduc-
tory essays attacking the federal courts in general terms. 15 Part Two in-
the failings of the courts in serving the needs of society. See, e.g., J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: 
THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM (1969). More recently, even the Supreme Court Justices 
have suggested the need for some types of institutional reform. See Justices Propose f/al')'ing 
Solutions to Supreme Court Overload, The Third Branch, Sept. 1982, at 1. 
9. In fairness to the authors, I believe that their goals should define the proper purview of 
my commentary. Since I understand Blueprint as an attempt to promote change in the courts, I 
evaluate it strictly in that sense. I neither challenge nor endorse the philosophical and moral 
premises that underlie the arguments in Blueprint, nor do I call into question the political 
partialities reflected throughout its pages. 
10. For example, the topics include critiques of affirmative action, p. 63, the Legal Services 
Corporation, p. 79, the Federal Election Commission, p. 143, and the American Bar Associa-
tion, p. 281. 
11. See, e.g., Jordan & Rubin, Government Regulation and Economic Efficiency: The Role 
of Conservative Legal Foundations, p. 241. 
12. A typical example is found at page 165, where, in a single paragraph, quotation marks 
are omitted, the quotations are incorrectly transcribed, and the quotations are attributed to the 
wrong source. 
13. Noticeably absent from among the contributors are any members of the federal judici-
ary or, for that matter, any active judges. 
14. Their views are succinctly summarized in the Foreword to the book, which states: "In 
place of the values of family, faith and freedom, enshrined in a Constitution under God, many 
federal judges now support a movement toward humanism and social change, designed to 
transform our schools, homes, libraries, media and culture into vessels of socialism, sexual 
liberation, atheism and amorality." P. vii. 
15. Ervin, Judicial f/erbicide: An Affront lo the Constitution, p. 3; Rice, Judicial Supremacy 
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eludes four essays that argue for greater oversight and control of the federal 
courts by Congress16 and two essays that fustigate specific nonjudicial pro-
grams.17 Part Three consists of four works on the operations of administra-
tive agencies, 18 while Part Four provides a catch-all category for favorite 
"New Right" causes.19 Part Five contains two essays on religious free-
and the Balance of Powers, p. 17. The first essay argues that the courts have failed to interpret 
the Constitution according to its "true meaning," p. 8, while the second claims that the 
Supreme Court's self-proclaimed supremacy in the interpretation of the Constitution has upset 
the balance of power among the three branches of the government. 
16. East, The Case for Withdrawal of Jurisdiction, p. 29; Stanmeyer, Governing the Judie,: 
ary, p. 37; Ha=ond, Congressional Oversight of the Federal Judiciary, p. 95; Grassley, Judicial 
Nominations and the Senate's "Advice and Consent Function," p. 107. The authors suggest 
various means whereby Congress can achieve greater control over the courts, including the 
congressional withdrawal of federal court jurisdiction over selected matters, pp. 30, 98, im-
proved statutory draftsmanship, p. 101, a more aggressive questioning of judicial nominees 
with respect to their interpretation of specific provisions of the Constitution, p. 109, and more 
exacting oversight of court activities, p. 98. Mr. Stanmeyer also suggests a constitutional 
amendment providing for congressional review of judicial decisions. The amendment would 
permit the Congress to overturn Supreme Court opinions by a two-thirds majority vote in each 
House, and to overturn lower federal court and state court decisions by a simple majority vote 
in each House. P. 57. 
17. Hatch, The Son of Separate But Equal· The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, p. 
63; Jenkins, The Legal Services Corporation and the Poor: J)oes It Meet Their Needs?, p. 79. 
The first essay attacks affirmative action programs, labeling them "immoral" and "unconstitu-
tional," p. 75, while the second argues for the replacement of the Legal Services Corporation 
with tax incentives for private lawyers who engage in pro bono publico work, p. 91. 
18. Sowell, Knowledge and J)ecisions: Administrative Agencies, p. 119; Momboisse, Reform 
of Administrative Procedures, p. 127; Rothenberg, Government by Bureaucracy: The Role of the 
Federal Election Commission, p. 143; Mandelman & Simpson,Intervenor Funding: Recommen-
dations for Reform, p. 163. Mr. Sowell's essay is primarily descriptive, suggesting that, in 
exercising regulatory powers, federal agencies are able to enact, enforce and interpret law in a 
manner constitutionally forbidden to other organs of the government, p. 123. Mr. Momboisse 
suggests a number of administrative procedure reforms which would decrease the discretion 
exercised by regulatory agencies. For example, the reforms include increased oversight and 
review of agencies by Congress and other agencies, pp. 128-30, increased pre-notice, notice, 
and record requirements in rulemaking proceedings, pp. 132-37, and elimination of the legal 
presumption that the agency has acted within its authority. Pp. 138-39. Mr. Rothenberg spe-
cifically criticizes the activities of the Federal Election Commission in regulating political cam-
paigns, reco=ending the elimination of contribution limits and FEC "quasi-judicial" 
powers, while retaining financial disclosure requirements. Pp. 155-60. Senator Simpson and 
Mr. Mandelman suggest limitations on the government funding of intervenor activities in 
agency proceedings, pp. 176-77, including "an affirmative requirement that at least one-third 
of any intervenor funding money allocated to a given proceeding must go to the groups or 
firms that would have to comply with the proposed rule." P. 177. 
19. Doolittle, The Resurrection of the Tenth Amendment: Restoring Balance to the Federal 
System, p. 183; Harvey, A Proposal far Reform of Federal Judiciary and Federal Regulatory 
Agencies: A New Beginning, p. 195; Ashcroft, Possible Alternatives to Forced Busing, p. 209; 
Gerard, A Proposal to Amend Article IIL· Putting a Check on Antidemocratic Courts, p. 217; 
Jordan & Rubin, Government Regulation and Economic Efficiency: The Role of Conservative 
Legal Foundations, p. 241; Rice, The Role of Legal Education in Judicial Reform, p. 273; Rees, 
The American Bar Association: Its Cause and Cure, p. 281. The reforms reco=ended in these 
essays range from the gradational to the transilient. For example, Mr. Doolittle's essay 
presents a familiar argument for the increased judicial recognition of the tenth amendment as 
an affirmative limitation on federal power. In contrast, Mr. Gerard's piece suggests a radical 
rewriting of Article III of the Constitution. The proposed amendment would eliminate life-
time tenure for federal judges, p. 229, provide for retention elections held at least once every 
six years, p. 227- 30, and permit Congress to remove judges who are "incompetent or who 
misconduct themselves." P. 227. Under this "short-form impeachment" power, p. 230, "mis-
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dom,20 while the final section consists of a single concluding essay by the 
editors.21 
As this brief outline indicates, the editors have attempted to cover a 
wide spectrum of topics. Across this spectrum they have selected essays 
arguing for radical reform of the structure, operation, and identity of the 
federal courts. Yet it seems that they have given little thought to the role of 
books as a medium for advocating institutional change. Books are of lim-
ited value in inciting revolutions; if the editors expect their efforts to be 
effective, they must do more than simply publish a laundry list of com-
plaints. They must pursue some strategy of persuasion. 
A book, properly employed as a persuasive device, offers a number of 
opportunities for institutional reform. If the institution is receptive to rea-
son, a book can encourage change through the presentation of thoughtful 
analysis. If the institution is subject to popular pressure, a book can pro-
mote change by consolidating or focussing the public's discontent. Courts, 
by nature of their institutional role, are responsive to both reasoned analy-
sis and, at least indirectly, to popular opinion.22 Yet Blueprint fails to har-
ness effectively either of these forces in arguing its case for judicial reform. 
Blueprint's essays contain little in the way of thoughtful analysis. In-
stead they consistently advance depthless arguments in attacking the fed-
eral courts. For example, they repeatedly complain that federal courts 
misconstrue the Constitution,23 quarrelling with the courts' interpretation 
conduct" would include "establishing broad social policies on the basis of values that cannot 
be derived from the language, structure or history of the Constitution." P. 225. Recom-
mending statutory reforms that are equally revolutionary, Mr. Harvey suggests that, in provid-
ing for the review of agency actions, Congress should vest state courts in the region most 
economically affected by a federal regulation with exclusive jurisdiction over all legal chal-
lenges to the regulation. P. 196. For example, the author envisions Indiana, Ohio and Michi-
gan state courts exercising jurisdiction over all questions involving federal automobile safety 
and emission standards. P. 196. Mr. Ashcroft recites the familiar litany of evils that result 
from the use of busing in integration remedies, p. 210, but despite the title of his essay, does not 
suggest any alternatives. The final three essays argue, respectively, that litigation by conserva-
tive legal foundations can promote efficient regulation, p. 264, that law schools should deem-
phasize case law in teaching constitutional law courses, p. 275, and that the American Bar 
Association does not adequately represent the interests of its members. Pp. 288-89. 
20. McClellan, The Making and the Unmaking of the Establishment Clause, p. 295; Ball, 
Religious Liberty: New Issues and Past Decisions, p. 327. The first essay presents an historical 
analysis of the Establishment Clause and concludes that recent decisions are not consistent 
with the framers' intent. The second essay considers emerging religious liberty questions, such 
as tax exemption for, pp. 330-31, and regulation of, pp. 335-39, private religious institutions. 
21. McGuigan & Rader, Judicial Oligarchy: Have the People Ceased to be Their Own Rul-
ers?, p. 353. The editors charge that the federal judiciary has usurped the legislative functions 
of Congress and the States. Pp. 355-61. They cite various opinion polls to bolster their claim 
that the viewpoints and reforms suggested in Blueprint have the support of a majority of the 
American people. Pp. 361-66. 
22. The conscientious judge certainly pays attention to the scholarly analysis provided by 
law reviews, as Shepard's Citations for law review articles might suggest. His decisions are also 
informed by his everyday experience, of which public opinion plays a part. Moreover, he is 
aware that institutions must be responsive to public opinion if they are to remain viable, In-
deed, as one co=entator has noted with regard to the Supreme Court, "it is hard to find a 
single historical instance when the Court has stood firm for very long against a really clear 
wave of public demand." R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 (1960). 
23. See, e.g., Doolittle, supra note 19, at 185; East, supra note 16, at 34; Ervin, supra note 
15, at 7; Gerard, supra note 19, at 217; Grassley, supra note 16, at 107; Hammond, supra note 
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of the terms "establishment ofreligion,"24 "due process,"25 and "equal pro-
tection."26 However, the essays do not attempt to provide a meaningful 
analysis of the meaning of these terms,27 nor do they address the attempts 
by scholars to arrive at principled definitions.28 Various contributors sim-
ply assert that these terms reflect their moral values, citing the "true" (pp. 8, 
107) "plain" (p. 39) and "natural" (p. 40) meaning of the Constitution. Such 
conclusional statements hardly provide convincing arguments that judges 
have misinterpreted the Constitution. 
If these contributors have a reasoned basis for arguing that judges have 
misconstrued the Constitution, they do not advance it, nor do they provide 
a principled theory of interpretation29 that will lead to the results they ad-
vocate. Instead, one contributor simply states that ''the words of the Con-
stitution must be understood to mean what they say" (p. 7). Another 
dismisses attempts by the courts to develop coherent theories of constitu-
tional law as "an unfortunate judicial propensity to replace common sense 
by scholastic theorizing about abstractions" (p.41 ). In making these state-
ments, the contributors seem to suggest that the Constitution should govern 
disputes not through the rule of articulated reasoning, but rather through 
the fiat of autocratic words such as "common sense."30 
The essays display a similar shallow approach in condemning various 
examples of ''judicial activism."31 They make no attempt to develop con-
16, at 98; Hatch, supra note 17, at 63; McClellan, supra note 20, at 318-19; Stanmeyer, supra 
note 16, at 39-42. 
24. See, e.g. , McClellan, supra note 20, at 295. 
25. See, e.g., Stanmeyer, supra note 16, at 42-44. 
26. See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 17; Ashcroft, supra note 19. 
27. Instead, the authors tend to support their interpretations by citing "eternal" or 
"everlasting truths," pp. 4, 5, 13, "fundamental political ideals," p. 74, and their own subjective 
versions of morality, pp. 75, 211. Senator Hatch goes a step further, introducing a remarkable 
historical perspective in opposing affirmative action. He states, ''The idea of a 'color blind' 
Constitution, as referred to by the elder Justice Harlan in his classicPlessy dissent, now seems 
more remote than during even the most entrenched days of Jim Crow and Theodore Bilbo." 
P. 63. Notwithstanding Senator Hatch's apparent views to the contrary, I suspect that the elder 
Justice Harlan would find the present approach to equal protection preferable to that applied 
in 1896. 
28. See, e.g., Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982); Lupu, 
Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979). 
29. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Sandalow, Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 19 MICH. L. REv. 1033 (1981): Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 13 HARV. L. REV. l (1959). 
30. In order to remedy the court's alleged misinterpretation of the Constitution, the con-
tributors suggest that either the power of interpretation be assumed by other branches of gov-
ernment, pp. 18, 33, 38, or that the identity of the courts be altered to make them responsive to 
political pressures, p. 217. But the contributors fail to recognize that the question of who 
should decide constitutional issues is inextricably linked to the question of how constitutional 
issues should be decided. The question of how constitutional issues should be decided requires 
some theory of constitutional interpretation, and as previously noted, see text at note 29 supra, 
the contributors develop none. Thus, Blueprint fails not only to establish its assertion that 
judges have misconstrued the Constitution, but also to provide judicial reforms that are re-
sponsive to the asserted problem. 
31. See, e.g., East,supra note 16, at 33; Gerard,supra note 19, at 217; Grassley,supra note 
16 at 107; Hatch,supra note 17 at 64-65; Rice, supra note 15, at 17; Stanmeyer, supra note 16, 
at 37-38. The most frequently mentioned examples of "activism" are collected in Mr. 
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sistent and principled arguments addressing the proper role of the courts in 
American government.32 Again, the authors simply analyze court decisions 
on the basis of whether the results conform with their particular social val-
ues. The authors attack as "activist" decisions that provide rights of abor-
tion (pp. 39-42) and remedies for racial discrimination (pp. 354-57). Yet the 
authors condemn judicial "restraint" in cases involving the rights of the 
unborn (pp. 39-42) and affirmative action (pp. 68, 70, 76). 
This inconsistency is highlighted in the various authors' discussions of 
Brown v. Board of Education .33 The authors generally approve of the 
Supreme Court's Brown decision to desegregate public schools, notwith-
standing the Court's overruling of the long-standing precedent of Plessy v. 
Ferguson,34 and notwithstanding the dearth of constitutional language jus-
tifying the Court's results.35 Yet the authors provide no principled basis for 
distinguishing this species of "activism" from the "activism" they find ob-
jectionable. Likewise, many of their proposals to curtail ''judicial activism" 
are not aimed at defining the role of the courts in American government but 
instead at reaching certain results in specific cases.36 In sum, the authors 
fail to develop a convincing theory of the scope and powers of the federal 
courts and, under the guise of curtailing ''judicial activism," simply seek to 
overturn specific cases they deem wrongly decided. 
The contents of Blueprint clearly demonstrate that the book is not an 
exercise in considered legal analysis. As a scholarly product, Blueprint 
might charitably be described as an embarrassment. It pales in comparison 
to recent insightful works by conservative scholars.37 Blueprint stands scant 
chance of effecting judicial reform from within; it will be summarily dis-
carded by members of the legal community who approach law as a rea-
soned discipline. 
Of course, reason is not a prerequisite for reform. As previously men-
tioned,38 Blueprint might achieve change from without the legal community 
if it can effectively arouse public opinion. However, Blueprint is unlikely to 
effect change through this route as well. It is no easy task for a book to 
capture the public's eye; absent a scandal, books rarely incite the public to 
Stanmeyer's essay. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1962) (school prayer); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (integration). 
32. With the exception of some brief asides from Mr. Stanmeyer, pp. 45-50, the authors 
ignore the ongoing discussion among legal scholars on the proper role of the courts in effecting 
social change. See generally, A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 
(2d ed. 1978); C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981); J. Ely, supra note 29. 
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
35. See Stanmeyer, supra note 16, at 41; Hatch, supra note 16, at 63; McGuigan & Rader, 
supra note 16, at pp. 355-56. Indeed, McGuigan & Rader seem unwittingly to argue a position 
more "activist" than the Supreme Court itself took in Brown. They suggest that the Supreme 
Court should have simply overruled Plessy rather than engage in "sociological theorizing." P. 
356. But this would have resulted in the desegregation of all public facilities in the South in a 
single step. Clearly, the Supreme Court took a more cautious route, striving for a rationale 
that would limit its decision to public education as a first step in the dismantling of Jim Crow. 
36. See East,supra note 16, at 29-36 (elimination of federal court jurisdiction over selected 
issues); Ashcroft, pp. 209-15 (elimination of forced busing). 
37. See, e.g., R BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). 
38. See text at notes 2l-22supra. 
March 1983] Judicial Reform 817 
seek radical change.39 More often, they give identity and focus to a preex-
isting discontent, intensifying emotions while broadening and consolidating 
the base of public support.40 Even in this limited regard, Blueprint seems 
an unlikely candidate for inciting public opinion. It fails to meet the most 
basic criteria for catching the public's concern. 
If a book is to enlist public support it must first capture the public's 
attention; at a minimum, it must be readable. Kindly stated, Blueprint is not 
a book one cannot put down. Blueprint drones and meanders through 382 
pages of disjointed argument. It lacks the terse thematic structure familiar 
to successful revolutionary tracts.41 Blueprint simply is not a book that 
lends itself to widespread public attention. Indeed, it would be an act of 
allegiance to Blueprint's goals for any reader to plow through its pages. 
Those members of the public who do read Blueprint are unlikely to be 
swayed by its call for judicial reform. Certainly, Blueprint fails as an emo-
tional appeal for change. As Mr. Weyrich's pyric remarks forewam,42 
Blueprint does attempt to inflame its audience.43 However, it lacks the sort 
of moving oratorical style that calls the public to action. Instead, Blueprint 
casts its arguments in familiar phrases that have long since lost their glow. 
Blueprint's rhetoric does not incite emotions, nor can it replace the need for 
a focused and specific theme.44 
The editors of Blueprint cite statistics purporting to show broadly based 
public dissatisfaction with the courts (pp. 361-65). The statistics, however, 
suggest that this discontent is generally of low intensity and distributed 
across a wide spectrum of issues. If the contributors expect to harness pub-
lic opinion, they must focus and direct this vague and diffuse discontent 
39. Perhaps the paradigm example of the use of scandal to effect change is Upton Sinclair's 
work, The Jungle (1906). The book, intended as an attack on working conditions in the Chi-
cago stockyards, aroused public concern over the quality of processed meat and encouraged 
the passage of food inspection laws. No such similar scandal has arisen in the judiciary. The 
most scandalous account of the courts is perhaps The Brethren, which hardly stirs the heart or 
stomach. See B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT (1979). 
40. Familiar examples in this regard might include William Lloyd Garrison's abolitionist 
newspaper, the Liberator (1831-65) or Alan Paton's novel, Cry, the Beloved Country (1948). 
41. Compare, for example, the pithy arguments of Thomas Paine's Common Sense (1776). 
42. See text at notes 4-6 supra. 
43. Blueprint relies heavily on overstated rhetoric. For example, a contributor describes 
judges appointed by Presidents Nixon and Ford as ''upper class liberal sharpies." P. vii. An-
other interprets the Supreme Court's decision regarding religious observance in public schools 
as "the expulsion of Christianity" and the "de facto 'establishment' of Secular Humanism as 
the country's 'official religion.'" P. 40. 
44. Indeed, some authors seem to get swept away by their own slogans and lose sight of 
their arguments. For example, in Harvey, A Proposal for Reform of Federal Judicial Review 
and Federal Regulatory Agencies: A New Beginning, p. 195, the author apparently attempts to 
develop the theme that the federal courts have failed properly to police federal agencies. How-
ever, this theme quickly dissolves into a vague, rambling discussion of the abuse of political 
power, including an irrelevant digressionary attack on the democratically elected president of 
France. President Mitterrand is described as ''thoroughly anachronistic and demogogic," "a 
committed socialist in the mold of Lenin" who "seeks or craves" total power. P. 206 n.14. He 
is portrayed as leading a "march, eventually, to the socialist camps at Auschwitz and the Gu-
lag,'' p. 200. Having expounded at some length on Mr. Mitterrand's qualifications for political 
office, the author offers no explanation of how this lecture pertains to the role of the federal 
courts in reviewing the actions of administrative agencies. 
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into political support for change. Instead, Blueprint pursues a spectrum of 
topics as broad as the asserted discontent, without concentrating or intensi-
fying the felt dissatisfaction. If the collection of essays were more narrowly 
focused on a particular deficiency of the courts, or simply devoted to an 
attack on the judiciary alone, Blueprint would stand a better chance of 
achieving its announced goals. Instead, by pursuing a scatter shot attack on 
all things federal, Blueprint fails to identify a specific, recognizable target at 
which to direct a public outcry. Furthermore, if Blueprint expects to galva-
nize and consolidate public discontent into broadly based support, it must 
show some inclination toward moderation and some receptivity toward di-
versity of opinion. However, in addressing a broad range of topics, 
Blueprint withholds a corresponding broadmindedness. The contributors 
approach each of twenty-two topics in a vehemently conservative fashion, 
displaying consistent and uncompromising rigidity. In attempting to gore 
twenty-two distinct oxen with the same dull blade, the editors of Blueprint 
forego the opportunity to build a coalition of support. Such a coalition 
seems crucial to their cause: I doubt that public discontent can ever be 
mobilized on a grand scale by a call to arms that is so broadly directed and 
yet so radically doctrinaire.45 
In sum, Blueprint fails as a vehicle for achieving meaningful change in 
the judiciary. It fails both as an appeal to reason and as an attempt to 
mobilize public discontent. Members of the legal community who thought-
fully have considered the deficiencies of our courts, so-called "liberals" and 
"conservatives" alike, will discern that Blueprint provides less than half a 
dialogue and consequently will dismiss the book as a poorly drafted ha-
rangue that adds only decibles to the debate. Members of the general public 
who manage to finish Blueprint will be unmoved by its clamoring, desultory 
call for change. 
In my evaluation of Blueprint as a vehicle for change, I have proceeded 
along a "result-oriented" path. I have attached no normative preference to 
the application of reasoned analysis and the incitement of public discontent 
as potential mechanisms for promoting institutional reform. In this regard, 
I conclude with a modest suggestion. Our courts serve society first and 
foremost as institutions of reason. Change in our institutions is inevitable 
as our culture evolves, and advocates of change are free to choose their 
mechanism for achieving reform. They can approach judicial reform 
through a careful, considered and persuasive analysis of the role of the 
courts in American government. Or they might pursue a less disciplined 
path, attempting to generate a public demand for change in the judiciary 
because of specific decisions reached by the courts on inherently divisive 
and controversial issues. I believe that public discontent with an institution 
is a symptom of the need for change. However, the function of courts as 
institutions of reason suggests that reasoned analysis provides the preferred 
45. I suspect that many persons who support the editors' conservative stand on a highly 
visible, isolated issue, such as forced busing of school children, have no interest or enthusiasm 
in supporting calls for reform of the American Bar Association, p. 281, or the Federal Election 
Commission, p. 143. It seems likely that only dedicated extremists will be interested in joining 
a coalition of extremes. Indeed, I suspect that many of Blueprint's authors who express deeply 
conservative convictions on particular issues do not endorse the views of their co-contributors 
on other topics. 
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mechanism for their reform.46 In this regard, I return to the conflagrant 
statements of Mr. Weyrich. He declared that the goal of Blueprint was to 
start a "real prairie fire" and to make judicial reform a "hot political is-
sue."47 Perhaps he should reconsider the uses of fire. Flames kindled for 
light, rather than heat, might better serve the interests of judicial reform. 
46. In the words of Learned Hand: 
So you will see that a judge is in a contradictory position; he is pulled by two opposite 
forces. On the one hand he must not enforce whatever he thinks best; he must leave that 
to the common will expressed by the government. On the other, he must try as best he can 
to put into concrete form what that will is, not by slavishly following the words, but by 
trying honestly to say what was the underlying purpose expressed. Nobody does this 
exactly right; great judges do it better than the rest of us. It is necessary that someone 
shall do it, if we are to realize that we can collectively rule ourselves. And so, while it is 
proper that people should find fault when their judges fail, it is only reasonable that they 
should recognize the difficulties. Perhaps it is also fair to ask that before the judges are 
blamed they shall be given the credit of having tried to do their best. Let them be severely 
brought to book, when they go wrong, but by those who will take the trouble to 
understand. 
L. HAND, How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 109-10 
(1952). 
47. See text at notes 4-6 supra. 
